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Abstract Mortgage brokers have grown in importance in the home
mortgage origination process in recent years, suggesting they
provide a valuable service matching borrowers and lenders,
although their involvement has also been linked to the recent
surge in mortgage defaults and foreclosures. As in other markets
dominated by brokers, agents’incentives are often poorly aligned
with those with whom they do business, in this case both the
lenders who bear the risks once the loan is originated and the
consumer who assumes liability for the debt and contract terms.
This paper describes the institutional arrangements under which
mortgage brokers operate and empirically test whether loans
originated by mortgage brokers are lower in cost than those that
would be available directly from retail lenders. The results
suggest that loans originated by brokers cost borrowers about 20
basis points more, on average, than retail loans and that this
premium is higher for lower income and lower credit score
borrowers.
According to a previous posting on the National Association of Mortgage Brokers
(NAMB) website,1 mortgage brokers:
‘‘are real estate ﬁnancing professionals acting as the intermediary
between consumers and lenders during mortgage transactions. A
mortgage broker works with consumers to help them through the
complex mortgage origination process. A typical broker has a working
relationship with numerous banks and other lenders and provides the
consumer with access to hundreds of options when it comes to ﬁnancing
a home. This allows mortgage brokers to provide consumers the most
efﬁcient and cost-effective method of obtaining a mortgage that ﬁts the
consumer’s ﬁnancial goals and circumstances. Mortgage brokers have
helped many consumers, including low-to-moderate income borrowers
with less than perfect credit histories, enjoy the beneﬁts of
homeownership.’’
The importance of brokers in the mortgage industry has grown signiﬁcantly in
recent years, especially since the availability of automated underwriting circa236  LaCour-Little
1995. Again, according to NAMB, 53,000 mortgage brokerage ﬁrms employ
approximately 419,000 loan ofﬁcers, who produced approximately 65% of the
residential mortgage loans originated during calendar year 2004. This is an
increase from 52% of all loans in calendar year 1997 (LaCour-Little and Chun,
1999). Percentages for 2005–2006 may be still higher, though the recent mortgage
market turmoil caused the percentage to drop to 57% for the full year 2007 and
to 49% during the ﬁrst quarter of 2008 (Inside Mortgage Finance, 2008).
Moreover, real estate brokers, who often have mortgage broker afﬁliates or referral
relationships, account for about 86% of all home sales in the United States during
2003 (National Association of Realtors, 2004). Comparing these percentages to
the labor market, Posey and Yavas (2004) report that 35% of hiring occurs through
employment agencies. Clearly, real estate and mortgage lending are areas in which
brokers play a dominant role.
Using the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, it is possible to make
some estimates of the revenue derived from the mortgage brokerage business.
During calendar year 2006 (the peak of the housing market), approximately
14,000,000 residential mortgage loans were originated (Federal Reserve, 2007).2
This number includes both conventional and government-insured loans, for either
purchase or reﬁnancing, ﬁrst and junior liens, and loans secured by manufactured
housing, as well as HMDA-reportable multi-family loans.3 Moreover, since
HMDA does not cover all loans or all originators, this is a conservative estimate
of the size of the mortgage market. Assuming that brokers were involved with
60% of all originations, an average loan amount of $170,000 and that mortgage
brokers earn on average 2% on a transaction, these ﬁgures imply total industry
revenue of almost $29 billion in 2006.4 Such large ﬁgures have attracted attention
in the business press (see, for example, Wall Street Journal, 2007). The trade press
also frequently carries accounts of problematic behavior by mortgage brokers,
including fraud (see, for example, Berquist, 2005). Given the surge in foreclosures
and downturn in housing prices, employment in real-estate ﬁnance, including
mortgage brokers, has declined to 365,000 from a peak of 505,000 in October
2006 (Wall Street Journal, 2008).
Mortgage brokers are also lightly and inconsistently regulated. Backley, Niblack,
Pahl, Risbey, and Vockrodt (2006) discuss the topic of mortgage broker regulation,
noting that 28 states license the ﬁrm only, as opposed to individuals. They also
provide a limited comparison between Wisconsin and Minnesota, after adoption
of mortgage broker regulation by Wisconsin (in 1988) and Minnesota (in 1999).
Bankrate Monitor (2004) provides an online summary of state laws governing
mortgage brokers. According to this summary, Alabama, Alaska, Colorado,
Montana, and Wyoming have no regulation of mortgage brokers at all. Other states
impose various educational requirements, testing requirements, and/or ﬁnancial
requirements on either individual brokers and/or the ﬁrm employing them. Kleiner
and Todd (2007) analyze mortgage brokers as an emerging regulated occupation,
ﬁnding that certain aspects of mortgage broker regulation may affect market
outcomes. They ﬁnd, for example, that net worth and ﬁnancial bondingThe Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  237
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requirements for mortgage brokers are associated with modestly reduced broker
employment and subprime loan originations.
Mortgage brokers earn compensation for their services in several ways. First, they
may charge consumers points and fees for their services. Points are a function of
loan amount, while fees are invariant and may represent costs incurred by the
broker and then passed through to the consumer, possibly with some mark up
along the way (e.g., the cost to obtain a credit report on a prospective borrower)
or direct charges for the mortgage broker’s services, such as an underwriting or
document preparation. Controversial among broker revenue sources is the yield
spread premium (YSP), a payment by the lender to the broker for delivery of an
over-par note rate (e.g., a 6.00% loan in a 5.50% market). YSPs have survived
court challenges as illegal kick-backs under the Real Estate Settlement and
Procedures Act (RESPA) despite much litigation. For a further discussion of the
RESPA issues, see Jackson and Burlingame (2007). Mortgage brokers are not
legally the agent of either borrower or lender, a situation that further muddies the
water in terms of pricing and disclosure requirements.
The fundamental agency issue with mortgage broker compensation is that, within
a normal range, the more the principal (borrower) pays, the more the agent
(broker) makes.5 This is similar to other commission-based sales arrangements
such as those used by auto dealers, buyer’s brokers in the real estate market, and
similar transactions. YSPs are often defended as a mechanism to reduce the
transaction costs associated with mortgage ﬁnancing, particularly for liquidity-
constrained borrowers. For example, the so-called ‘‘no-cost reﬁnance’’ usually
simply means that all transaction costs are paid by the broker and recouped
through the YSP.6
Exhibit 1 provides a numerical example that is based on an actual publicly
available wholesale rate sheet.7 Such rate sheets are often available on the Internet
by searching on the term ‘‘wholesale rate sheet.’’ Examining Exhibit 1, the par
rate on this date for a 30-year ﬁxed-rate conforming conventional loan was
5.375%, meaning that loans bearing that note rate would be saleable by the broker
to the lender for 100. Thus, any compensation to be earned by the broker for a
loan priced at that rate would have to come from points and fees paid by the
borrower in cash to the broker. But, for example, a 6.0% coupon would also be
saleable at 102.50, producing a YSP to the mortgage broker of 2.50% of loan
amount. The broker could, in the $100,000 loan amount example shown, provide
$500 in ‘‘free’’ services to the borrower by, for example, covering the costs of
appraisal (say, $300), credit report (around $50), and preliminary title report (about
$150), and still net $2,000 in compensation on the transaction. In this case, any
points or fees also collected from the borrower would further enhance total broker
compensation.
Do these arrangements allow borrows to obtain the lowest possible rate from the
set of lenders active in their local market? Or are brokers simply extracting
economic rents from consumers due to their informational advantage and the238  LaCour-Little
Exhibit 1  Example of Wholesale Rate Sheet
Note Rate Price Payment YSP($) YPS (pts)
5.250 99.125 $552.20 $(875) 0.875
5.375 100.000 $559.97 $  0.000
5.500 100.500 $567.79 $500 0.500
5.750 101.250 $583.57 $1,250 1.250
6.000 102.500 $599.55 $2,500 2.500
6.125 102.750 $607.61 $2,750 2.750
6.250 103.125 $615.72 $3,125 3.125
6.375 103.625 $623.87 $3,625 3.625
6.500 104.000 $632.07 $4,000 4.000
Notes: The Note Rate and Price columns in the table above show the prices at which a particular
lender will fund conventional conforming 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages with 15-day delivery on
January 21, 2004. Using a $100,000 loan amount as an example, the three columns to the right
show the borrower’s monthly payment, the yield spread premium (YSP) in dollars, and the yield
spread premium in points. The YSP would be paid to the broker by the lender at closing.
complexity of the mortgage transaction? Do yield spread premiums help liquidity-
constrained borrowers ﬁnance home purchases or do they merely provide another
way for brokers to obscure the fees they are actually charging consumers? Do
brokers earn their income by reducing borrowers’ borrowing costs or only reduce
their search costs? These and related questions will be addressed in the analysis
presented here.
The plan for the balance of this paper is as follows. The next section reviews the
broader literature on brokers in the housing and mortgage markets and identiﬁes
research questions to be addressed. The third section describes the empirical data
used for the analysis. The fourth section describes the regression methodology
and the ﬁfth section reports results. A ﬁnal section concludes with policy
implications and suggestions for further research.
 Literature Review
The literature on principal-agent problems in economics is large so the review
here is necessarily limited. The problem is most often formulated as that of an
owner employing a manager whose unobservable effort affects proﬁts. The
economic question then is what is the optimal contract between the principal and
the agent? For a review of the broad literature, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987)
and Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995). The general question in the
mortgage context is whether the broker is seeking to maximize the welfare ofThe Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  239
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clients (by minimizing their search and/or borrowing costs) or maximizing their
own commission income.
Yavas (1992, 1994) focuses more narrowly on brokers and other middlemen, who
either make markets, by buying and selling for their own account, or providing
matching services to facilitate trades in markets with high search costs. Brokers
are matchmakers, inasmuch as they do not buy and sell themselves, but simply
bring together the parties to the transaction. Matchmakers arise in inefﬁcient
markets with high search costs and the beneﬁt they produce is a reduction in the
search costs, and the uncertainty as to whether the search will succeed, for the
parties that ultimately trade. Yavas (1992) shows that, under reasonable
assumptions, matchmakers reduce the range of prices at which a trade can take
place by altering the parties reservation prices and earn proﬁts (commissions)
reﬂecting the value of the services provided. In both papers, there is no clear
answer as to whether the presence of middlemen increases social welfare.
Signiﬁcant empirical work on the principal-agent problem has focused on the
home sale market. Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005) examine the conﬂict
between home sellers and their real estate brokers, who may be motivated to see
any transaction occur during the period of their listing contract rather than
maximizing the price received by their home-selling principal while minimizing
the time required to consummate a transaction. Using a data set of over 300,000
real estate transactions from several counties in Texas, Rutherford et al. found that
properties that were owned by a real estate agent sold no faster (and no slower)
than other properties, but did sell for about 4.5% more. This result, which is robust
to a number of model speciﬁcations, strongly suggests that real estate brokers do
not expend the same amount of effort on their principal’s properties, as compared
to their own.
Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2004) also focus on real estate brokers, in
particular, how their level of effort may vary with the type of listing contract
(exclusive right to sell versus exclusive agency) and house price level. They ﬁnd
that, for lower-priced houses, broker performance (as measured, for example, by
time-on-market and selling price discount) is negatively associated with alternative
listing arrangements, such as exclusive agency. One might argue that mortgage
broker relationships with customers are effectively exclusive agency arrangements
since the mortgage broker will not earn a commission if the borrower secures a
loan on their own by going directly to a retail lender. Since lower-priced houses
will support smaller loans and are likely owned by lower-income households,
worse outcomes for lower-income households in the mortgage market may be
consistent with this ﬁnding in the home sales market.
Gwin (2004) examines real estate broker decisions about the extent of information
provided to prospective buyers via Internet advertising. Providing more
information reduces broker costs but also risks disintermediation if the home buyer
obtains sufﬁcient information independently. In a theoretical model that includes
search costs, Gwin shows that buyers will choose to use a broker if transaction240  LaCour-Little
costs (broker fees) are less than the buyer’s total cost of searching for a home
independently, a process likely to have diminishing returns to additional search.
In an empirical analysis using cross-country comparisons, Gwin ﬁnds that real
estate brokers provide relatively more information if their prospective buyers have
relatively higher search costs. The analogies here to mortgage broker behavior are
less direct, though one might argue that borrowers will not search across multiple
brokers for the best deal since brokers will choose to provide similar levels of
information yielding minimal gains to additional borrower search.
Two published studies focus on the role of mortgage brokers directly. LaCour-
Little and Chun (1999) examined the prepayment behavior of residential
mortgages originated by mortgage brokers, as compared to loans originated
directly through the lender’s direct employees. LaCour-Little and Chun
hypothesized that since brokers can generate income by reﬁnancing existing
customers, they have an incentive to ‘‘churn’’ the portfolio of lenders with whom
they do business, particularly since it is very difﬁcult for lenders to monitor the
reason any particular borrower chooses to reﬁnance. Using data consisting of loan
level information on 16,974 ﬁxed-rate mortgage loans originated during calendar
year 1992, they found that loans originated by mortgage brokers were signiﬁcantly
more likely to prepay, after controlling for other factors affecting prepayment risk.
Moreover, they calculated that loans originated by mortgage brokers appeared to
be about three times more sensitive to reﬁnancing incentives, compared to retail
loans.
A similar study by Alexander, Grimshaw, McQueen, and Slade (2002) focused on
the default risk associated with subprime loans originated by mortgage brokers.
Alexander et al. found empirical evidence that loans originated by mortgage
brokers were more likely to default, after controlling for other risk factors, using
loan level data on 23,200 ﬁxed-rate ﬁrst lien subprime loans originated between
1996 and 1998. They also found that as the market became aware of this channel-
speciﬁc risk, coupons on loans originated by third parties increased by about 50
basis points relative to otherwise similar retail loans, implying that the risk was
priced as performance information became available. Default risk, of course, is
relatively easier to price than prepayment risk, since increasing the coupon on a
loan simply makes it more likely to prepay, other factors held constant. There is
some evidence that points paid may signal reduced prepayment risk, over and
above the reduction in coupon that payment of bona ﬁde discount points would
normally produce (Stanton and Wallace, 1998).
Several papers address issues related to the pricing of mortgages by mortgage
brokers. Woodward (2003) begins by noting the complexity of the mortgage
process and the difﬁculty of comparison shopping that consumers encounter. She
outlines and develops proxy measures for various shopping strategies a consumer
might employ, noting the uncertain trade-offs between points, fees, closing costs,
and note rate. A data set of 2,700 loans originated during the 1996–2001 period
is then used for empirical analysis. Average broker compensation is $2,425 on an
average loan size of $130,000 (nearly two points). Woodward regresses mortgageThe Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  241
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broker compensation on a set of factors likely to affect transaction costs, the ability
of the broker to price discriminate,8 proxies reﬂecting consumer confusion, and
borrower and neighborhood demographics. Among ﬁndings, she notes that broker
‘‘fees are profoundly related to borrower education...’’ (page 1), with less well-
educated borrowers paying their mortgage brokers signiﬁcantly more.
El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005) analyze the pricing of subprime
mortgages by brokers and lenders. They identify three potential agency problems:
(1) brokers may attempt to originate loans to borrowers who do not qualify, i.e.,
misrepresent borrower qualiﬁcations; (2) brokers may actively solicit borrowers
for reﬁnancing after the original loan is made; and (3) brokers may encourage
borrowers to select products or lenders that maximize broker income, rather than
acting in the borrower’s best interest. For convenience, these three issues are
referred to here as (1) misrepresentation, (2) churning, and (3) steering. As
previously described, the two prior published studies have addressed differential
default risk, potentially linked to misrepresentation, and differential prepayment
risk, potentially linked to churning, among loans originated by mortgage brokers.
The third issue, steering, is a particularly difﬁcult problem to identify, particularly
given the wide array of mortgage products available in the market and the differing
wholesale prices offered by distinct lenders. El-Anshasy et al. focus on the
narrower question of whether subprime loans originated through mortgage brokers
are more or less costly to borrowers compared to otherwise similar loans
originated directly through lenders. This is the empirical question addressed here,
too, though the data are on prime loans and a much smaller sample.
In their empirical analysis, El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005) used
the American Financial Services Association’s (AFSA) database, which contains
data on almost one million subprime loans originated by 10 large lenders between
1995 and 2003. Focusing on the annual percentage rate (APR) of loans originated,
the authors do not ﬁnd support for the claim that borrowers pay more for loans
originated through brokers, compared to loans made directly by lenders. In fact,
they report the rather surprising result that ‘‘broker-originated mortgages are less
costly to the borrowers than lender-originated mortgages after holding other loan
terms and borrower characteristics constant,’’ (page 12). In the regression results
presented, one speciﬁcation separately estimates the choice to use a mortgage
broker using an array of exogenous demographic census tract characteristics. Even
with this additional control for possible sample selection bias, loans priced by
mortgage brokers appear to cost 14–22 basis points9 less than loans originated
directly by lenders. One difﬁculty with this methodology is that if lenders place
limits on the risk of the loans they will originate through brokers (due to the
misrepresentation risk discussed above), then higher cost loans will necessarily
show up as non-broker originated and brokers may only appear to have a pricing
advantage over direct-from-lender loans. On the other hand, if brokers actually
search out the lowest rate, given risk, for their customers across multiple lenders
and those price-risk combinations do vary, then the broker-originated price may
reﬂect greater competition than the lender-originated rate, in which the borrower242  LaCour-Little
may have simply accepted whatever price the lender quoted without comparison
shopping.
Jackson and Burlingame (2007) discuss the issues surrounding YSPs from a legal
perspective, focusing on recent litigation and reporting results from plaintiff’s
expert testimony in litigation related to this issue. Jackson and Burlingame review
the legislative history of RESPA and argue that payment by lenders of YSPs is
problematic for a variety of reasons, including the lack of transparency of the
mortgage pricing process and the power of mortgage brokers, who they describe
as ‘‘market professionals,’’ to direct business to particular lenders. In their
empirical analysis [which uses approximately the same data as Woodward (2003)],
they report that over 80% of the broker-originated loans analyzed contained YSPs
averaging about $1,800 (1.5% of loan amount) and that only the minority
contained offsetting ﬁnancial beneﬁts (payment of other transaction costs) on
behalf of borrowers. Moreover, Jackson and Burlingame report that African-
American and Hispanic borrowers paid more than other borrowers. In terms of
the typical costs for broker-originated loans, articles in the trade press report
average broker fees of 2.5% for option ARMs, 1.88% for subprime loans, and
1.48% for standard ﬁxed-rate mortgages (Wall Street Journal, 2007).
Most recently, Woodward (2008) presents a study of FHA closing costs, including
fees paid to brokers, direct lenders, title insurance providers, and other real estate
service providers. She reports an average cost of $4,000 paid to mortgage brokers
and $3,150 paid to direct lenders using a nationwide sample of 7,560 FHA-insured
loans with an average initial loan amount of $105,000. Those fees include upfront
charges and YSPs. She ﬁnds that fees and charges vary widely, with evidence that
minority borrowers and those in areas with lower levels of education pay more.
Several other papers in the growing literature on loan pricing to consumers include
models that control for origination channel. While not speciﬁcally focused on the
topic of mortgage brokers, these papers provide additional evidence that the
origination channel matters for consumer outcomes. LaCour-Little (2007) in a
study focusing on low and moderate income borrowers purchasing homes during
2002, reports mixed results for broker originations across product categories. He
ﬁnds an 8 basis point premium in note rate for FHA loans originated by mortgage
products after controlling for a variety of pricing factors, but lower note rates for
broker originations in the nonprime, special affordable housing program, and
conventional conforming market segments. Courchane (2007), in the most
important recent study of mortgage loan pricing differentials by race, reports APR
price premiums for wholesale originations for both prime and subprime loans in
most cases. For example, using loan level data on almost 367,000 loans originated
during 2005, she ﬁnds that wholesale originations have APRs 31 basis points
higher in subprime and 23 basis points higher in prime, using an exogenous
switching framework to model origination in the subprime versus prime segments
of the market. Wholesale loans include those originated by correspondent lenders
which may, in turn, contain some mix of broker business.The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  243
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To brieﬂy preview our empirical results here using a much smaller dataset
consisting of prime loans, we ﬁnd the opposite effect from that reported by El-
Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2005) and results similar to those reported
by Woodward (2003, 2008) and Jackson and Burlingame (2007). We ﬁnd that
loans originated by brokers are more costly, on average, than loans available
directly from mortgage lenders. Moreover, while some borrowers obtain lower
prices through brokers, outcomes are unequal in the sense that lower income
borrowers appear to pay higher prices. This is consistent with a broader economics
literature on marketing practices and outcomes in consumer shopping and
bargaining in automobile sales, a similar ‘‘big ticket’’ item sold in a negotiated
market (Ayres and Seigelman, 1995; and Busse, Scott-Morten, and Zettelmeyer,
2006).
 Data
We exploit data from two different loan originators, both of whom prefer
anonymity, for the empirical analysis. Both sets of data include detailed
information on loans originated during calendar year 2000 in the state of Florida.
The ﬁrst lender (hereafter Lender A) originated loans through both broker and
retail channels and we have information on both. The second lender (hereafter
Lender B) originated loans through both channels; however, we have information
only on the broker-originated loans; however, the data is somewhat more detailed.
Given the two data sets, we can construct a test to determine whether broker-
originated loans were priced at a lower cost compared to those that would have
been available directly from at least one retail lender operating in the same
geographic market. This will allow us, in the second stage of our analysis, to
analyze those factors associated with higher broker pricing and the level of broker
compensation. The data set is relatively small, consisting of 834 loans originated
in the state of Florida during the ﬁrst nine months of calendar year 2000. There
are 346 retail loans and 488 broker-originated loans in total.
Exhibit 2 provides descriptive statistics on the two sets of loans. By construction,
all loans are ﬁxed rate and of conforming loan size ($252,700 for a single-family
unit during calendar year 2000).10 The average loan size is similar, slightly over
$100,000) and borrower income levels are similar in the $60–$80,000 range,
although slightly higher for broker-originated loans. The broker-originated loans
do have higher loan-to-value ratios with a mean of 83% versus 69% for the retail-
originated loans. Importantly, both sets of loans are to borrowers with prime level
credit scores, on average. In contrast, El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki’s
(2005) work, previously described, was based on subprime loans. Here the average
FICO score is 709 for the retail loans and 703 for the broker originations. The
average note rate for retail originations (with zero points) is 8.14% versus 8.42%
for broker-originated loans, implying an uncontrolled note rate premium for of 29
basis points for loans originated by mortgage brokers. Note that this is a low244  LaCour-Little
Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics
N Mean Std. Dev.
Retail Loans
Month that loan closed 346 5 2
Loan amount 346 $102,042 $54,754
Note rate 346 8.14 0.37
Loan term 346 310 81
FICO credit score 298 709 56
FICO credit score missing 346 0.14 0.35
Loan-to-value ratio 346 69 18
Borrower income 346 $61,699 $73,642
Indicator- not owner-occupied primary residence 346 0.12 0.32
Broker-Originated Loans
Month that loan closed 488 5 2
Loan amount 488 $121,371 $57,432
Note rate 488 8.42 0.37
Loan term 488 341 55
FICO credit score 463 703 54
FICO credit score missing 488 0.05 0.22
Loan-to-value ratio 488 83 14
Borrower income 488 $83,928 $78,961
Indicator- not owner-occupied primary residence 488 0.14 0.35
Notes: All loans closed during calendar year 2000. All loans for home purchase purpose. All
loans are conforming conventional ﬁxed rate.
estimate, since brokers often charge points and fees in addition, whereas the retail
loan data set we have is zero point pricing.11 We will use a regression approach
described in the next section to examine whether the uncontrolled pricing premium
persists after controlling for other factors that can be expected to affect loan
pricing.
 Regression Methodology
Loan pricing will naturally vary by loan product type, date of origination, credit
risk characteristics, and other factors. The effect of these factors may be constant
across origination channel or they may vary, depending on whether loans are
originated directly by lenders or through mortgage brokers. This suggests two
distinct regression strategies. If the factors affecting pricing are relatively constant
across origination channel, then a ﬁxed effect model simply adding an indicator
variable for a broker-originated loan will be sufﬁcient and the coefﬁcient on the
broker variable will measure the average increase (or decrease) in loan pricing
attributable to the broker channel. If, on the other hand, pricing varies across theThe Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  245
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two channels, then we should separately estimate pricing functions for each
channel and use the coefﬁcients from the retail model to calculate the implied
retail price for each broker-originated loan. We can then examine the distribution
of the differences between predicted retail and actual pricing on broker-originated
loans. We now discuss the factors affecting loan pricing in some detail, since these
will inform our model speciﬁcation.
The mortgage market, especially the prime mortgage market, is highly integrated
with the overall capital markets. As a result, the overall level of interest rates will
be the single most important factor in determining mortgage rates over time. We
capture the level of mortgage rates with the date on which the loan was originated.
Since our combined dataset includes only month and year of origination, this is
a somewhat imprecise measure. In addition, the rates actually received by
borrowers may be affected by decisions the borrower makes regarding rate locks.
Since we do not observe the date of loan application, nor the date on which the
loan rate was locked for retail loans, we have an additional source of imprecision
in this measure. Accordingly, we present three alternative speciﬁcations: (1)
simply using dummy variables for the month of loan origination; (2) using the
Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market rate during the month of loan origination;
and (3) using a two-month lagged 10-year Treasury rate. The two-month lag is
intend to capture the fact that loans are typically priced through a rate lock
mechanism at date of application, rather than the date of loan closing. We will
further discuss the issue of rate locks later in the paper and see that in the broker
channel borrower failure to lock the rate for a sufﬁciently long period is likely to
be a contributing factor to ultimate loan pricing outcomes.
Loan type is the second factor that can be expected to strongly inﬂuence ultimate
loan pricing. Loans with shorter amortization periods, 15 versus 30 years, typically
command discounts of approximately 25 basis points. We capture this effect with
an including indicator variable for a loan term shorter than the 30-year standard
contract, which include a few 20 year and 10 year amortization periods. In an
earlier version of the paper, we included a small number of adjustable rate loans;
however, the mix of these was quite different across the two lenders and pricing
varied widely depending on contract type and contract type was not consistent,
so to maintain homogeneity of loan type, we have simply dropped these in this
analysis.
Another element of loan pricing is eligibility for sale in the secondary market,
with jumbo loans typically priced slightly above the conforming loan rate which,
in turn, closely tracks the par yield price offered by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.
To eliminate this source of price variation, we limit our loans to those of
conforming loan size during calendar year 2000 ($252,700 for a single-family
unit). While not a risk factor per se, loan size is an important factor in the
economics of the loan origination process. Given ﬁxed costs of loan origination,
larger loans will produce more revenue for the lender and higher commission
income for the broker. Hence, we expect smaller loans to carry higher pricing. To
narrow the variation in this variable, we recode loan size using a logarithmic
transformation (LOGBAL).246  LaCour-Little
Risk-based adjustments are also common, even in the prime segment of the
mortgage market. Borrower credit score (FICO) and loan-to-value ratio (LTV) are
the two most widely recognized risk factors. We include both of these variables
in the regressions presented. Moreover, since loans with LTVs in excess of 80%
carry additional risk, we specify LTV as a categorical variable and expect higher
ratios to exhibit higher prices. Likewise, we expect the coefﬁcient on borrower
credit score (FICO) to be negative, since borrowers with better credit may receive
lower pricing.
There are additional variables that would be helpful in developing a more complete
speciﬁcation. In particular, time from application to closing would be helpful. If
borrowers beneﬁt from using a broker primarily in reduced search costs, then time
to close would be a useful proxy. Recent research on mortgage choice has
suggested that borrowers in the subprime segment receive, in addition to more
liberal underwriting, an accelerated processing time (LaCour-Little, 2007) as
measured by time from application to closing. The data set contains this
information for the broker-originated loans but not for the retail loans, so we
cannot use it in the ﬁrst stages of our analysis, though we will come back to this
variable later when attempting to identify those factors that lead to differential
pricing outcomes and greater compensation to the broker.
Since we cannot observe differential search costs, we limit the analysis to the
more direct question of whether borrowers obtaining loans through brokers obtain
more favorable pricing compared to what would be available from a direct retail
lender. To do this, we ﬁrst estimate the ﬁxed effects model, pooling loans across
origination channel and including an indicator variable for loans originated by
brokers. Second, we estimate the same model using retail loans only. Third, we
use the coefﬁcients from the retail model to predict, loan-by-loan, the price that
would have been available for broker-originated loans had the borrower counter-
factually obtained a retail loan from Lender A. Fourth, we examine the difference
(premium or discount) that the borrowers could have obtained with a direct retail
loan. Finally, we assess the factors that may explain this rate differential and which
contribute to overall broker compensation.
 Empirical Results
The results are shown in Exhibits 3–7. In Exhibit 3, we report results from a ﬁxed
effects model including an indicator variable for a broker-originated loan. In
Exhibit 4, the retail model used to predict loan-by-loan retail pricing is shown. In
Exhibit 5, the distribution of the difference between the actual rate on a loan
originated by brokers and the predicted retail rate is shown. Exhibit 6 presents
analysis of the factors that are predictive of the loan-by-loan rate differential
illustrated in Exhibit 5. Exhibit 7 examines the effect of this same set of factors
























































Exhibit 3  Fixed Effects Model with Broker Indicator
Panel A Panel B Panel C













Intercept 10.124 0.287 35.3 9.228 0.731 12.62 9.761 0.420 23.2
Not owner occupied primary residence 0.134 0.034 4.0 0.137 0.035 3.95 0.135 0.035 3.9
Loan term less than 30 years 0.254 0.031 8.2 0.256 0.032 8.01 0.257 0.032 8.1
Natural log of loan balance 0.154 0.021 7.3 0.141 0.022 6.45 0.143 0.022 6.5
FICO credit score 0.0006 0.0002 2.9 0.0006 0.0002 2.74 0.0006 0.0002 2.6
FICO credit score missing 0.443 0.159 2.8 0.436 0.164 2.65 0.423 0.164 2.6
LTV over 80%, under 90% 0.111 0.063 1.8 0.085 0.065 1.32 0.085 0.065 1.3
LTV over 90%, under 95% 0.175 0.035 5.0 0.190 0.036 5.29 0.193 0.036 5.4
LTV over 95% 0.212 0.031 6.8 0.218 0.032 6.78 0.219 0.032 6.8

















Exhibit 3  (continued)
Fixed Effects Model with Broker Indicator
Panel A Panel B Panel C













Loan closed in February 0.216 0.051 4.2
Loan close in March 0.287 0.048 6.0
Loan closed in April 0.168 0.048 3.5
Loan closed in May 0.231 0.047 4.9
Loan close in June 0.340 0.046 7.5
Loan closed in July 0.318 0.048 6.6
Loan closed in August 0.175 0.049 3.5
Freddie Mac 30-Year Rate in Month Closed 0.117 0.082 1.4 0.071 0.050 1.4
Two Month Lagged 10-Year Treasury Rate
Root MSE 0.32 0.33 0.33
Adj. R2 0.35 0.30 0.30
Note: The dependent variable is Note Rate.The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  249
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Intercept 9.032 0.455 19.8
Not owner occupied primary residence 0.214 0.057 3.7
Loan term less than 30 years 0.223 0.043 5.2
Natural log of loan balance 0.093 0.033 2.9
FICO credit score 0.0001 0.004 0.3
FICO credit score missing 0.167 0.266 0.6
LTV over 80%, under 90% 0.053 0.097 0.5
LTV over 90%, under 95% 0.096 0.080 1.2
LTV over 95% 0.068 0.066 1.0
Loan closed in February 0.224 0.086 2.6
Loan close in March 0.397 0.078 5.1
Loan closed in April 0.210 0.079 2.6
Loan closed in May 0.244 0.075 3.2
Loan close in June 0.321 0.076 4.2
Loan closed in July 0.432 0.079 5.5
Loan closed in August 0.208 0.089 2.3
Root MSE 0.33
Adj. R2 Adj. R2 0.19
Notes: The dependent variable is Note Rate. N  348.
Exhibit 5  Distribution of Rate Differential
Quantiles
1 100% Max 0.94
2 90% 0.66
3 75% 0.49
4 50% Median 0.21
5 25% 0.02
6 10% 0.22
7 0% Min 1.03
Notes: Distribution of rate differential, deﬁned as the actual note rate for broker-originated loans

















Exhibit 6  Results of a Regression of the Rate Differential from Exhibit 5
Dependent Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D

















Estimate Std Error t-Value
Intercept 0.184 0.091 2.0 0.120 0.090 1.3 0.403 0.246 1.64 0.291 0.353 0.8
Rate lock period 15 days or less 0.219 0.040 5.4 0.135 0.043 3.2 0.085 0.043 2.01 0.046 0.090 0.9
Rate lock period 15–30 days 0.062 0.042 1.5 0.033 0.041 0.8 0.018 0.040 0.44 0.040 0.710 0.5
Borrower income (in thousands) 0.001 0.191 3.5 0.001 0.188 3.5 0.0005 0.186 2.68 0.0002 0.710 0.5
Borrower years of education 0.003 0.005 0.5 0.0004 0.005 0.1 0.001 0.005 0.16 0.005 0.900 0.4
Borrower under age 30 0.089 0.037 2.4 0.076 0.036 2.1 0.024 0.036 0.65 0.036 0.600 0.6
Borrower is Black 0.179 0.079 2.3 0.114 0.077 1.48 0.088 0.910 0.4























































Exhibit 6  (continued)
Results of a Regression of the Rate Differential from Exhibit 5
Dependent Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D

















Estimate Std Error t-Value
LTV 0.003 0.001 3.14 0.001 0.001 1.1
FICO 0.001 0.272 2.73 0.001 0.0003 2.0
FICO missing 0.285 0.197 1.45 0.202 0.195 1.0
Brokers indicator variables NR NR 2.5*
Root MSE 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.27
Adj. R2 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.49
Notes: There are 104 broker dummy variables.
NR: Not Reported

















Exhibit 7  Effect on Total Broker Compensation
Dependent Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D




















Intercept 1.380 0.271 5.1 1.245 0.270 4.6 1.617 0.723 2.2 2.352 0.995 2.4
Rate lock period 15 days or less 0.897 0.126 7.1 0.740 0.131 5.6 0.557 0.126 4.4 0.405 0.130 3.1
Rate lock period 15–30 days 0.169 0.125 1.4 0.110 0.124 0.9 0.056 0.118 0.5 0.121 0.112 1.1
Point paid 0.751 0.045 16.6 0.698 0.047 14.9 0.671 0.045 15.1 0.485 0.047 10.2
Borrower income (in thousands) 0.002 0.001 3.4 0.002 0.001 3.4 0.001 0.001 2.3 0.000 0.001 0.1
Borrower years of education 0.010 0.016 0.6 0.015 0.015 1.0 0.015 0.015 1.0 0.007 0.015 0.5
Borrower under age 30 0.140 0.111 1.3 0.117 0.110 1.1 0.083 0.107 0.8 0.024 0.100 0.2
Borrower is Black 0.500 0.240 2.1 0.252 0.229 1.1 0.315 0.247 1.3























































Exhibit 7  (continued)
Effect on Total Broker Compensation
Dependent Variables
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D




















LTV 0.017 0.003 5.4 0.008 0.003 2.6
FICO 0.002 0.001 2.9 0.002 0.001 2.4
FICO missing 0.895 0.578 1.6 0.608 0.549 1.1
Brokers indicator variables NR NR 13.5*
Root MSE 0.93 0.92 0.87 0.74
Adj. R2 0.53 0.54 0.59 0.76
Notes:
NR: Not Reported
*F-statistic for all dummy variables.254  LaCour-Little
Beginning with the ﬁxed effects model in Exhibit 3, we obtain very similar results
across the three speciﬁcations (Panels A, B, and C), regardless of how we control
for the overall level of interest rates at the time of loan origination. Moreover, the
factors affecting loan pricing are directionally as expected and coefﬁcient
magnitudes are very similar across speciﬁcations. Loans on non-owner occupied
primary residences carry a 13–14 basis point premium in note rate.12 Loans with
terms of less than 30 years have note rates 25–26 basis points lower than the
standard long-term contract. Based on the consistently negative sign on the natural
log of loan amount, larger loans carry lower note rates, after controlling for credit
risk. Speciﬁc credit risk differences are reﬂected in borrower credit score (FICO)
and indicator variables for a LTV above 80% and above 90% and 95%. Higher
credit scores reduce note rates whereas higher LTVs increase it. Finally, the
coefﬁcient on broker-originated loans is consistent at about 20 basis points and
statistically signiﬁcant in all three speciﬁcations.
In Exhibit 4, we report the regression model used to generate the prediction of
retail loan pricing. The model uses data from Lender A (retail loans) only. The
results are generally quite similar to those shown in the ﬁxed effects model shown
in Exhibit 3, although standard errors are larger and overall model explanatory
power is reduced. For example, the coefﬁcient for credit score is virtually identical
and the estimate for the effect of a shorter amortization period is 22 basis points
versus 25–26 basis points. As in Exhibit 3, larger loans, loans to borrowers with
higher credit scores, and loans with shorter amortization periods carry lower
interest rates, other factors held constant.
Next, we use the coefﬁcients from the model reported in Exhibit 4 to predict,
loan-by-loan, the retail pricing of all loans originated by brokers and funded by
Lender B. The resulting difference in rate is coded so that a positive value
represents a higher price by the broker and a negative value a lower price. While
we know from the ﬁxed effects model that broker loans appear to be priced, on
average, 20 basis points higher than would have been available from a direct retail
lender, there may be particular instances when broker match-making produced a
lower rate for the borrower. In addition, we wish to understand those factors that
are predictive of the rate differential obtained through brokers.
In Exhibit 5, we tabulate the distribution of the difference in note rate between
actual broker pricing and predicted retail pricing. This variable is coded so that a
positive value means a higher price through a broker; we will sometimes refer to
this as the broker premium. The range on the variable is roughly plus or minus
100 basis points. Broker pricing is higher in about 75% of the cases, with a median
rate differential of 21 basis points, very similar to the 20 basis points we obtained
with the ﬁxed effects model. For about 25% of borrowers, however, the broker
appears to have obtained a lower rate than we predict would have been available
on a retail basis. This implies that in some instances, brokers were able to obtain
a loan that was lower in price than would have been otherwise been available.
How this beneﬁt varies with borrower characteristics will be our next topic.The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  255
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Since we now focus exclusively on the broker-originated loans, we can use
additional variables available in the data from Lender B that was not available
from Lender A. Notably this includes borrower education (measured in years of
educational attainment), race, and age, as well as details on the length of the rate
lock period and number of points paid. We re-code several of these variables into
categorical format for ease of interpretation. Speciﬁcally, we create dummy
variables for rate lock periods that are shorter than average (less than or equal to
15 days and 15–30 days, with the hold out period being more than 30 days). We
also create a categorical variable for young borrowers, deﬁned as age less than
30. It seems reasonable to assume that younger borrowers are more likely to be
ﬁrst-time home buyers who are less familiar with the mortgage lending process.
In Exhibit 6, we report the results of a regression of the rate differential from
Exhibit 5 on these new covariates over four speciﬁcations. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation
(Panel A), we incorporate the rate lock variables and what one might term the
basic demographic factors of income, age, and education, which are intended to
proxy for level of ﬁnancial sophistication and, perhaps, bargaining ability. In the
second speciﬁcation (Panel B), we add borrower race, a variable which may, or
may not, be an additional proxy for ﬁnancial sophistication, but for which speciﬁc
protections exist, given federal law that prohibits varying the price of credit based
on borrower race or ethnicity. In the third speciﬁcation (Panel C), we add the two
primary risk factors, LTV ratio and credit score, since these may be correlated
with demographic characteristics. For example, if brokers are able to extract higher
premiums from borrowers with low credit scores and credit score is correlated
with race, then failure to control for credit score may lead to biased conclusions
regarding the effect of race. In the fourth speciﬁcation, we include dummy
variables for the identity of each of the 100 plus mortgage brokers in the data.
In Panel A in Exhibit 6, the coefﬁcient on rate lock period of 15 days or less is
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, as is the coefﬁcients on borrower age under
30. The coefﬁcient on borrower income is negative and statistically signiﬁcant,
suggesting that higher income borrowers pay lower rate differentials. The
coefﬁcients on rate lock period from 15 to 30 days and on borrower years of
schooling are not statistically signiﬁcant. In Panel B, the coefﬁcients have the
same sign and signiﬁcance, although smaller magnitudes and the coefﬁcients on
the additional race variables (dummy variables for Black or Hispanic borrower)
are positive and signiﬁcant, with magnitudes of 18 and 15 basis points,
respectively. In Panel C, when we add credit score and LTV ratio, both are
signiﬁcant (higher credit score borrowers receive lower rate differentials and
higher LTV borrowers receive higher rate differentials) and the magnitude and
signiﬁcance of some of the demographic variables changes, suggesting correlation
across factors. For example, borrower age is no longer signiﬁcant, nor is the
indicator for Black borrower. Income, however, continues to be negative and
statistically signiﬁcant in this speciﬁcation. In Panel D, however, when we add
indicator variables for individual brokers, none of the demographic variables256  LaCour-Little
retains signiﬁcance. After controlling for broker identity, i.e., allowing for
variation across brokers, the only factor that retains signiﬁcance is credit score:
borrowers with higher scores pay smaller rate premiums.
Next, in Exhibit 7, we consider how these factors affect total broker compensation,
deﬁned as the YSP plus points and fees charged directly to the borrower. These
origination fees ranged from zero to 500 basis points, with a mean value of 88
basis points. Total broker compensation has a mean value of 2.53 points ($2,818)
here, indicating that most of the broker’s compensation is derived from YSP. We
have in our data the total amount of broker compensation and points charged, but
we do not have details on other fees nor the exact amount of the YSP, although
broker compensation less points is a good approximation.
In Exhibit 7, we report the results from a regression of total broker compensation
on a similar set of factors as that used in Exhibit 6. Since broker compensation
includes points, we add this factor to the speciﬁcation. Again, Panel A includes
basic demographics, Panel B adds race to the speciﬁcation, Panel C adds credit
score and LTV ratio, and Panel D adds dummy variables for each of the individual
brokers. In general, the pattern of results is quite similar to that shown in Exhibit
6.
In Panel A in Exhibit 7, broker compensation is strongly affected by points paid
and this relationship persists across the four speciﬁcations. A short rate lock period
also positively contributes to broker compensation. Borrower income continues to
be negative, implying that brokers earn relatively less from higher income
borrowers. This result is consistent across the ﬁrst three speciﬁcations but again
disappears when we allow for cross-broker variation. Years of educational
attainment and borrower age are not statistically signiﬁcant in any speciﬁcation.
Borrower race is signiﬁcant, though less so when we control for credit score and
LTV ratio, and is not signiﬁcant when we allow for cross-broker variation in Panel
D. In this ﬁnal speciﬁcation, short rate lock period, points paid, LTV ratio, and
credit score are the only factors that retain statistical signiﬁcance.
 Robustness Tests
Given our relatively small data set, robustness testing is prudent to ensure the
stability of empirical results. Up to this point, we have reported results that are
remarkably consistent regardless of how the level of interest rates is speciﬁed and
regardless of whether we estimate a ﬁxed effects model or allow slope coefﬁcients
to vary and estimate pricing differences loan-by-loan. One obvious risk, however,
is sample selection bias. If borrowers who choose to use brokers are systematically
different from borrowers who obtain loans directly from retail lenders, then those
differences may be reﬂected in the rates they pay independent of the actions of
mortgage brokers. After all, these are not experimental data in which borrowers
are randomly assigned to receive the broker treatment. In this section, we describe
our approach to control for this potential problem.The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  257
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We follow the well-known Heckman (1979) two-stage approach. In the ﬁrst stage,
the probability of broker use is estimated via probit regression. From the results
of the probit equation, the inverse mills ratio is computed. Then, in the second
stage we add the inverse mills ratio to the OLS speciﬁcation reported in Panel A
of Exhibit 3. A positive and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on the inverse mills ratio is
evidence of sample selection bias; however, inclusion of this variable as a covariate
controls for that bias and the coefﬁcient on broker will be unbiased.
The results are presented in the Appendix. For the probit equation, for which we
omit results in the interest of brevity, we estimate the probability of broker use
based on factors that are expected to be exogenous to the behavior of brokers with
respect to loan pricing. In particular, we use interest rate level variables (the level
of the 10-year Treasury and the mortgage-Treasury spread) and the appraised value
of the collateral property. In the second-stage OLS regression, the inverse mills
ratio is negative and not statistically signiﬁcant. More importantly, however, the
coefﬁcient estimate for broker is virtually unchanged at 0.20. For convenience,
we reproduce results from Panel A of Exhibit 3 so that all of the coefﬁcient
estimates may be compared, with and without controls for potential sample
selection bias. Differences are minimal. We conclude from this exercise that
sample selection bias is not affecting our fundamental result that broker-originated
loans cost borrowers more than otherwise similar retail loans.
Another implicit assumption we have made is that all brokers are identical, hence,
a single indicator variable for broker-originated. But Guttentag (2007)
recommends borrowers deal only with ‘‘Upfront Mortgage Brokers’’(UMBs) who
have made the commitment to do business in a fully transparent way. These
brokers disclose their fees to customers in advance and in writing and also the
wholesale prices they can access from the market. Customers pay a mortgage
broker fee disclosed upfront plus wholesale loan prices. While it would desirable
to know whether any of the brokers in our sample are members of this
organization, our broker identiﬁer is numeric only, so we cannot match broker
identities to those shown on the UMB website. We note, moreover, that there are
only ten members of this organization in Florida as of 2007 and that the
organization did not come into existence until 2005.
As reported previously, we also estimated the models of the determinants of the
rate difference and of broker compensation reported incorporating dummy
variables for the 104 mortgage brokers in our data, recognizing that most brokers
contributed only a very small number of loans to the data.13 As might be expected,
adding such a large number of covariates, increases model explanatory power
considerably, raising the adjusted R-squared value from .17 to 0.8 (Exhibit 6) and
from .53 to .76 (Exhibit 7).
Examining the coefﬁcients on the individual broker identiﬁers, the vast majority
are not statistically signiﬁcant. Two that appeared to be in Panel D of Exhibit 6
are broker number 58 (with a large negative sign) and broker number 93 (with a
large positive sign). Further examination showed that each of these brokers258  LaCour-Little
contributed only one loan to the data set. This underscores the difﬁculty in
assessing the effect of mortgage brokers in the aggregate. The problem of better
monitoring broker behavior would be reduced were they subject to reporting
requirements along the lines of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, federal law
that applies to most lenders.
Finally, it would be appropriate to consider whether patterns of broker pricing
vary across geography. Unfortunately, we do not have geographic identiﬁers for
the broker-originated data. We know only that all loans originated in Florida. A
larger data set with variation across geography, particularly across states that have
different levels of broker regulation, would allow such additional important issues
to be explored.
 Conclusion
Mortgage brokers have grown in importance in recent years, especially since 1995
when new technology made automated underwriting widely available. Does this
market evolution translate to a rate reduction beneﬁt to borrowers, since brokers’
superior information allows them to match individual credit applications to the
lender with the lowest price for their particular situation? Or are broker fees simply
earned by reducing borrower search costs, but not the explicit cost of credit? We
have attempted to examine these question in the analysis presented here. Since
we do not have a good proxy for borrower search costs, however, we address the
narrower question of whether loans originated through brokers command lower
interest rates than those that would have been available from a direct retail lender
in the same market at the same point in time. Our answer to this question is no,
not in general.
Our results indicate that prime loans originated by mortgage brokers are priced
about 20 basis points higher than otherwise comparable retail loans, a result that
conﬂicts with El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki’s (2005) ﬁnding for the
subprime market but which are consistent with Woodward’s (2008) results for
FHA loans. Moreover, ours is a low estimate of the broker pricing premium since
it reﬂects the difference in note rate only, not including the effect of points or
fees, which can be substantial. While the median increase in note rate for loans
originated by brokers is 21 basis points, for about 25% of borrowers, the price
obtained through the mortgage broker was lower than predicted from a retail
lender. This ﬁnding suggests that mortgage brokers may reduce credit costs for at
least some borrowers. But these savings do seem to vary by borrower type, with
higher income borrowers or borrowers with better credit obtaining lower rates
from use of a broker and lower income borrowers and/or borrowers with poorer
credit not realizing this same advantage. These borrower characteristics are likely
to be correlated with other borrower characteristics, such as race or age.
By focusing on the incremental interest costs associated with use of a mortgage
broker, we are not implying that the value of brokers’services is limited to explicitThe Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  259
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savings in credit costs. Reduction in search costs, increased convenience, and
perhaps overall ease of the transaction itself could well motivate some borrowers
to prefer obtaining their loans through brokers, notwithstanding the apparent price
increment associated with doing so. Moreover, our data set is relatively small and
based on a single geography and time period, so the results may not be general.
Nevertheless, given the growth in the share of residential mortgages originated by
brokers and the inherent conﬂict of incentives faced by principal and agent, we
believe further research along these lines, preferably with larger data sets and
multiple lenders, is warranted.
Many of the current regulatory proposals intended to address the problems in the
mortgage market that have resulted in the recent surge of defaults and foreclosures
contemplate greater regulation of mortgage brokers. For example, legislation
pending in the U.S. Senate currently includes the ‘‘Secure and Fair Enforcement
for Mortgage Licensing Act of 2008.’’ Provisions of the bill are intended to
encourage states, through the Conference of State Bank Supervisors and the
American Association of Residential Mortgage Regulators, to set up a nationwide
mortgage licensing system. The bill also outlines procedures, requirements
(including education and testing), and standards for mandatory registration and
state licensing of loan originators. Similar legislation introduced by House
Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has been passed by the
House of Representatives.
The analysis presented here suggests that further regulation of mortgage brokers
may be well be warranted; however, it is not clear that licensing per se would
improve outcomes given the economic incentives and agency problems in the
originations segment of the mortgage market. Better disclosure of broker
compensation may be possible, too, and have some positive effects. But a new
model for compensation of mortgage originators is needed, one that better aligns
incentives across parties.
 Appendix
  Robustness Test for Sample Selection Bias: Fixed Effects












Intercept 10.124 0.287 35.3 11.685 1.210 9.7
Not owner occupied primary residence 0.134 0.034 4.0 0.139 0.034 4.4












Natural log of loan balance 0.154 0.021 7.3 0.157 0.021 3.6
FICO credit score 0.0006 0.0002 2.9 0.001 0.0002 4.9
FICO credit score missing 0.443 0.159 2.8 0.441 0.159 7.5
LTV over 80%, under 90% 0.111 0.063 1.8 0.112 0.063 6.7
LTV over 90%, under 95% 0.175 0.035 5.0 0.180 0.035 3.7
LTV over 95% 0.212 0.031 6.8 0.215 0.031 4.1
Broker-originated loan 0.204 0.025 8.2 0.204 0.025 8.3
Loan closed in February 0.216 0.051 4.2 0.226 0.052 7.4
Loan close in March 0.287 0.048 6.0 0.305 0.049 2.9
Loan closed in April 0.168 0.048 3.5 0.172 0.049 2.8
Loan closed in May 0.231 0.047 4.9 0.266 0.054 1.8
Loan close in June 0.340 0.046 7.5 0.341 0.046 5.2
Loan closed in July 0.318 0.048 6.6 0.319 0.048 6.9
Loan closed in August 0.175 0.049 3.5 0.185 0.050 8.2
Inverse mills ratio 1.977 1.490 1.3
Root MSE 0.32 0.32
Adj. R2 0.35 0.36
Note: The dependent variable is Note Rate.
 Endnotes
1 National Association of Mortgage Brokers: http://www.namb.org/about namb/
mission.htm.
2 See the Federal Reserve Bulletin, Summer 2007, for an extensive review of the 2006
HMDA data.
3 Most commercial mortgages on multi-family properties are not reportable under HMDA.
4 This is almost surely a low estimate. Woodward (2003) reports average mortgage broker
compensation of $2,425 per loan using a small sample of 2,700 loans with average loan
size of $130,000, originated during 1996–2001, implying average broker compensation
of 1.9%; Woodward (2008) reports average broker fees of $4,000 on FHA loans.
5 Some lenders cap mortgage broker compensation so that, for example, a YSP will be
paid for over-par coupons, but only up to a certain level. Since those caps may vary by
loan type, they may create incentives to brokers in and of themselves. Likewise, some
lenders limit allowable points and fees collected by mortgage brokers.The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers  261
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6 While technology has surely reduced the cost of mortgage transactions over time, fees
for appraisal, title search and title policies, recording fees, and other governmental taxes
are real costs that cannot generally be eliminated, though automated valuation systems
have made some inroads in reducing appraisal costs.
7 Exhibit 1 shows a portion of the wholesale rate sheet for National Bank of Commerce
for January 21, 2004, with calculations by the author to provide dollar amounts.
8 In this context, price discrimination refers to the economic concept of charging each
buyer the maximum they are willing to pay as opposed to any sort of illegal
discrimination based on protected class membership.
9 In El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki’s (2005) Table 3, the coefﬁcient for broker-
originated on ﬁrst-lien ﬁxed-rate loans is 0.14 and for variable rate loans it is 0.22.
The coefﬁcient for hybrid loans is 1.87.
10 While all loans appear to be conforming conventional at origination, we do not know
whether they were ultimately sold in the secondary market or retained in portfolio by
the originating lender.
11 Fees paid for third-party services, such as appraisal and title insurance, do not affect the
overall APR of the loan and we assume here that such costs are identical across retail
and broker-originated loans.
12 A small fraction of both the retail and broker-originated loans are for properties that are
not the borrower’s primary residence, these could be either investment properties or
second homes.
13 We have 488 broker loans and 104 distinct brokers. The largest number of loans from
a single broker was 26 and many brokers contributed only one or two loans to the data.
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